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Introduction
It is a commonplace in contemporary scholarly debate on populism that the extreme 
ambiguity of the term makes any attempt of a clear-cut defi nition diﬃ  cult. At the same 
time, the growing number of publications in the fi eld points to the public signifi cance 
of the problem called “populism”. What makes populism a hot issue in scholarly 
discourse, despite the “unsuccessful” attempts to seize a complex and contradictory 
social phenomenon, is that it deeply touches the problem of democracy. In other 
words, the debate on populism, to a large extent, is about democracy. It is however 
the relationship of populism to democracy which is discussed in the literature, with 
an explicit focus on the former. The question is usually put as “Is populism a threat 
or a corrective to democracy?”, and the typical answer is formulated in the “populism 
vs. democracy” paradigm (e.g. Taggart 2000, Mény & Surel 2002), even if Ernesto 
Laclau’s opposite view is referenced, whereby populism is a possible way for political 
life to be structured (Laclau 2005). Whatever the answer to the question of populism’s 
relation to democracy might be, the focus is on populism’s eﬀ ect on democracy, while 
the problem of democracy per se, if treated at all, remains secondary.
The introductory work of Cas Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser is exemplary in this 
regard. The authors argue that populism can work as either a threat or a corrective 
1 This study was supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office of Hungary 
(NKFIH, PD 115736).
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to democracy, and that the relation between the two is debated among the experts; 
they contend, however, that “it is not far-fetched to suggest that the conventional 
position is that populism constitutes an intrinsic danger to democracy” (Mudde 
& Kaltwasser 2017: 79). They solve the problem stemming from the ambiguity 
of populism by diﬀ erentiating between democracy (the combination of popular 
sovereignty and majority rule) and liberal democracy (the same combination together 
with the institutional protection of fundamental rights). They can thus declare that 
“populism is essentially democratic, but at odds with liberal democracy, the dominant 
model of the contemporary world” (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017: 81). When dealing 
with populism, their argument remains deliberately and explicitly within the context 
of liberal democracy. The theoretical model developed by the authors does allow a 
certain role for populism in the process of democratization, but only in the transition 
from “full authoritarianism” to “competitive authoritarianism”. In the long run, 
populism’s eﬀ ect on “real” – that is, liberal – democracy is, in their view, undoubtedly 
negative. Mudde and Kaltwasser thus actually reproduce the ambiguity of populism 
as both democratic and antidemocratic, since they do not deal with the possibility of 
populism’s corrective relation to (non-liberal) democracy (a possibility which, after 
all, arises logically from their defi nition).
This article argues that it is instructive to engage in the problematization of 
democracy in the discussion about populism’s democratic or antidemocratic nature 
(Moﬃ  tt 2016). This extension of the object might contribute to solve the ambiguity 
seemingly inherent in populism. I propose a sociological case study; its historical 
context enables this operation: the public debate on democracy in early post-war 
Hungary. First, the transitional period after the end of World War II and before the 
communist takeover in Hungary lacked one single idea of democracy that could have 
been normatively imposed. The discourse analyzed here addressed precisely the 
normative principles of the defi nition of democracy. Instead of addressing the question 
of whether or not the political system was democratic in Hungary between 1945 and 
1949,2 I will thus analyze the principles of legitimacy in the public debate on democracy. 
This sociological historical reconstruction serves critical purposes by confronting 
currently prevailing conceptions of populism and democracy. In the (eventually 
failed) post-war democratic utopia the central problem was self-constitution – that 
is, the legitimate demarcation of the political community. The defi nitional struggles 
over democracy reached far beyond the correct meaning of the term: they discursively 
demarcated the demos in relation to the antidemocratic population, tracing the border 
between “democratic” and “antidemocratic”. In this sense, the democracy-utopia that 
stands out from the diﬀ erent normative statements on what the political system should 
be in the country is characterized by the refl exivity towards its own boundaries. 
Consequently, democracy constituted the political problem par excellence of the 
period, which traced the borders of the less and less autonomous public sphere after 
the war (Zombory 2015). In other words, democracy was not just one topic among 
others publicly discussed; political issues were problematized in the context of 
2 On the history of the so-called coalition period, see Borhi 2004, Palasik 2011. For an overview of the 
Hungarian historiography on the (anti)democratic nature of early post-war Hungary, see Völgyesi 2011.
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democracy.3  The following study is a discourse analysis of the public focusing on 
diﬀ erent sources such as political programs, manifestos of political parties, public 
lectures, and press debates.4  It applies, on the one hand, a prospective perspective 
(Lotman 1990) when focusing on the views and acts of the post-war historical actors; 
on the other, it reconstructs the political imagery of the period by the methodology of 
conceptual history (Koselleck 1985). The reconstruction of the discursive fi eld about 
democracy, focusing on the principles of the legitimate constitution of the political 
community, aims to explore how the institutional process of democratization was 
conceived in the post-catastrophic period.5
A second particularity of the historical context is that there existed in Hungary 
a socially and historically embedded populist movement [népi mozgalom], which 
played an important role in post-war political life.6  To cross-fertilize the discourse 
analysis with the history of the populist movement in Hungary, I will deal with the 
positions of its representative fi gures in the fi eld of the debate. With regards to this 
history, it is worth remarking that the great political moment of Hungarian populists 
came at the end of the war, and only lasted until the communist takeover.7  The party 
of the populists, the National Peasant Party [Nemzeti Parasztpárt, NPP], took part 
in the coalition, which made them a powerful political agent, since they had access 
to political decision making at diﬀ erent levels and spheres of administration. At the 
same time, the NPP gained only 6.87% at the general and free elections in 1945, and 
could not considerably increase its constituency before the annihilation of the limited 
3 From this perspective, it is beside the point whether or not the communists acted on the command of the 
Soviet Union; or if they really meant what they said or if they were cynical. Since they did not follow the 
politics of immediate and violent takeover, that is, proletarian revolution, they had to publicly legitimize their 
claims.
4 The publication of press products was certainly restricted in the defeated Axis country but the ideological 
landscape in the public was nevertheless quite diverse under the aegis of the Soviet led Allied Control 
Commission. Until at least 1947, there was no direct and exclusive communist control on the press. See Vince 
2016: 255-364.
5 The establishment of the courts of political justice well exemplifies the institutionalization of the democracy-
discourse: the so-called people’s courts not only were legitimized by the relationship between the conception 
of the historical catastrophe and the democracy-utopia, but also the same discourse defined the constitution 
and operation of the councils of people’s courts (Zombory 2017b). In other words, the term “discourse” 
applied here is not opposed to those of “practice” and “institution”.
6 The agrarian movement of the populists originates in literature, with the publications of the so-called populist 
authors in the early 1930s. The second half of the decade was marked by the appearance of several seminal 
publications of popular sociography. Political organization came only with the third wave of the movement, 
in the second half of the 1930. Though the National Peasant Party was officially formed in 1939, as a political 
force it was only organized in late 1944. On the populist movement in Hungary, see Papp 2012; on the 
National Peasant Party, see Tóth 1972.
7 Leading figures of the populists were quite passive during the war years. Imre Kovács was an exception, as he 
took active part in the otherwise small and weak Hungarian resistance movement. Probably due to his role, the 
party in late 1944 was included in the antifascist coalition, the Hungarian National Front for Independence, 
which later formed the nonelected provisional government. Since the same five parties, the populists included, 
got into the parliament according to their support in the general elections, based on universal suffrage, in 
November 1945, the same coalition continued to exercise political power. In order of number of mandates in 
the parliament, they were: the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP), the one and only right-wing force, 
with an absolute majority; the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP); the Social Democratic Party (SzDP); the 
National Peasant Party (NPP); and the Civic Democratic Party (PDP). The civic democrats were excluded 
from the political elite soon after, which reduced the coalition to four parties.
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multiparty system. Beyond the institutionalization of the Cold War and the increasing 
communist pressure on domestic politics, the relative failure of the populists is to 
be found in the features of the political system as a whole: the coalition government 
realized several objectives of the populist movement (one of the fi rst measures of 
the new regime, for example, was the land reform in March 1945, a long-requested 
populist claim). New political institutions, such as people’s courts or the new public 
education were established in sharp opposition to the former antidemocratic elite. 
Also, the political forces of the coalition in many respects were as “populist” as the 
Peasant Party.8  Simply put, it was the democratic utopia, seemingly commonly shared 
by the political forces, that took the wind out of the populists’ sail.
The following argument is divided into two parts. From a historical sociological 
perspective, the fi rst maps out the discursive fi eld in which diﬀ erent positions were 
taken in the debate about democracy and explore the positions of leading political 
representatives of the populist movement. The second part of the paper will discuss the 
populists’ position in the redefi nition of the ethnoscape: their standpoint towards the 
“Jewish question” and the “German question”, the two disappearing social categories 
in relation to which the movement articulated its program before the war.
1. Constituting the demos
“'Democracy': in this word, there is all that constitutes the fate of Hungarian society 
after the catastrophe” – says the foreword to the volume of the same title, published 
in 1945 (Erdei et. al. 1945). The book comprises the public lectures of leading 
politicians and scholars on democracy, organized by the University of Péter Pázmány 
in Budapest, 1945. The program happened to be a huge success, which drove the 
university to publish the material – and shows the almost extreme public interest 
in what democracy meant to people. As the above-cited sentence demonstrates, 
democracy appeared as a question of fate for Hungarian society, a matter of life-and-
death in the social history of the nation. This question was, however, open-ended. 
The quotation marks refer to the normative uncertainty and semantic multiplicity of 
the idea of democracy. One of the most important characteristics of the public debate 
on democracy was the lack of a uniform meaning, or at least a commonly shared 
normative reference basis. Politicians, scholars and intellectuals found the model of 
democracy in diﬀ erent historical and geographical contexts: reference points often 
mentioned were the French Revolution, England and the USA, and the Soviet Union 
or, in a negative sense, the Weimar Republic. 
8 Certainly, one has to take into account the historicity of populism itself. The agrarian populism in the first 
half of the 20th century was in many respects different from today’s populist movements: it favored social 
modernization and represented class interests (primarily the lower-class peasants and the agrarian laborers). 
Instead of underlying similarities between old and new populist movements (anti-elitism and diverse political 
ideology), this paper aims to emphasize the importance of taking into account the historical transformation of 
politics at large. After all, not only the populist movement was class based and modernizationist in the middle 
of the 20th century.
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Moreover, there was no considerable democratic tradition in Hungarian history to 
which it would have been possible to relate.9  As a result, every agent struggled to 
monopolize the defi nition of democracy in an instable and open discursive fi eld. To 
give a striking example, in a pastoral letter entitled “On the Crimes of New Paganism, 
on True Democracy and Freedom,” even the Church declared that Catholic believers 
can practice democratic rights the best because “they took the principles of true 
democracy from the Gospel” (A katolikus püspökök pásztorlevele, 1945).
The question of democracy was future-oriented, arising “after the catastrophe” 
(Zombory 2017a): post-war political actors situated themselves in a transitional 
period, between the political and moral failure of Hungary during the war, and a 
fully established democracy. They perceived the problems of the present as those 
of democracy, and attributed them to the eﬀ ects of the past, the consequences of 
the recent historical catastrophe. The destruction of the war was one aspect of the 
conception of the catastrophe. Even in December 1946, Zoltán Tildy (FKgP), president 
of the republic emphasized the signifi cance of the “country-building work” in his talk 
“Our National Tasks”: among these, he mentioned the cleanup of the ruins and the 
rectifi cation of shortages caused by the war and destruction (Tildy 1947). However, 
the recent catastrophe aﬀ ected not only the material world, but also the moral life of 
the country. As Tildy put it in the fi rst issue of the periodical Demokrácia, “The past, 
which we must overcome quickly and defi nitively, left not only terrible ruins and 
material destruction, but also intellectual chaos, blindness, an obsolete outlook on life, 
and sick, anti-democratic social attitudes” (Tildy 1945).
Not surprisingly, the future goal of post-war reconstruction was at the core of 
the programs of the political forces. And the national task of reconstruction was 
conceived as the complete establishment of democracy. Let us examine the stands 
of the coalition parties. A 1945 Smallholders’ Party booklet stated, under the chapter 
“Our most important and urgent tasks”, that “Hungary received the biggest blow of 
its history in this war. We know that it will take a long time to defi nitively abolish 
the traces of this blow, and we can create the peaceful situation of democratic times. 
Politically our fi rst task is to brush aside the reactionary elements of public life and 
carry out the exemplary and severe punishment of war criminals” (Nagy 1945: 29). 
The author, Ferenc Nagy, General Secretary of the Smallholders Party, explained 
the formation of the party in 1930 as follows: “the people of the land had been 
excluded from the government of the country, and a politically, economically and 
socially reactionary and anti-popular regime began” (Nagy 1945: 5). A resolution of 
the Hungarian Communist Party’s national meeting in May 1945, entitled “Struggle 
for reconstruction,” declared, “With the annihilation of the fascist barbarism, and 
the restitution of peace, it is the task of reconstruction that comes to the fore. The 
reconstruction is the crucial test of the young Hungarian democracy; all the strength 
9 More precisely, the political movement of the Hungarian Octobrists that is, the representatives of the 1918 
civic revolution, were divided following the end of the Second World War, partly in emigration, and could 
not organize themselves politically (Litván 2005). Though references were frequent to the civic revolution 
of 1848, and the preparation of its centenary played an important role in the post-war system, one could not 
rely on a more-or-less continual cultural heritage of Hungarian democracy. This had important consequences 
on the project of national rebirth of the new political-cultural elite (cf. the antifascist humanism of the “Other 
Germany” in the very same period (Agocs 2017)).
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of the nation must be focused on this. […] One of the most important preconditions 
for realizing the program of reconstruction is to fi nally begin in full force the struggle 
against fascism and the Arrow Cross remnants” (Rákosi és Szabó 1979: 82-83). The 
action program of the social democrats, adopted at their annual congress in August 
1945, formulates the same relation between democracy and reconstruction:
“Today for democracy and reconstruction of the country. These two are one. The 
reconstruction of the country is only possible in the pure atmosphere of democracy, and 
only the merciless struggle against reaction can assure the success of reconstruction. 
And vice-versa: without reconstruction, there is no, because there cannot be, democracy” 
(Rákosi és Szabó 1979: 104).
For the social democrats, the goal, socialism, was the question of tomorrow. 
In May 1945, in Szabad Szó, the daily newspaper of the National Peasant Party, 
President Péter Veres formulated the stakes of reconstruction: “if we do not put our 
full strength into reconstruction, [...] then we’ll again be left behind. We’ll lag behind, 
we’ll waste away, and we will follow the same backward formula as the old Hungary, 
here among the fresh, fi ghting, believing and active peoples of East-Central Europe” 
(Veres 1945a).
This quick overview of the coalition’s political palette helps us draw the discursive 
fi eld from a historical sociological perspective. The historical experience of the 
actors was of a post-catastrophic transitional period, which would fi nally provide the 
opportunity to construct democracy. As the horizon of expectation, democracy was 
closely intertwined with the post-war reconstruction. The historical catastrophe, as 
a space of experience, appeared as the cause of the present political problems. Thus, 
the eﬀ ort to establish a democratic system through material and mental reconstruction 
required the elimination of the remnants of the past. This “regime of historicity” 
(Hartog 2015) relied on a concept of history as a unidirectional fl ow of events, a 
progress of civilization, in relation to which the position of a society could be gauged.
The most important feature of the post-war discursive fi eld was the democracy 
paradox: the nation constituted both the subject and the object of political action 
aiming to reconstruct the country. On the one hand, the problem arose as the necessary 
restriction of the political community: how to establish democracy without risking that 
the people vote for the anti-democratic ancient regime? On the other hand, the subject 
of politics also arose as a problem. Who constitutes the political subject that realizes 
the demarcation of the political community? In other words, how can democracy be 
practiced by a people that have been so far deprived of political agency? The debate 
on democracy was about the boundaries of the demos. On the one hand, early post-war 
politics was driven by the demand to exclude those representing the old regime from 
the possibility of political agency, a demand supported by the space of experience 
of the actors. On the other, the politics of constituting the demos was driven by the 
demand to include the previously suppressed people into the nation – that is, the 
political community – making them a political subject; this demand of “liberating 
the people” was supported by the horizon of expectations for democracy. Thus, the 
democracy paradox had its proper temporality. The continuity with the former regime, 
the “remnants of the past”, was targeted by the concepts of fascism and/or reaction. 
The former meant the return of the past, the latter the return to the past (lagging 
behind). One aspect of the democracy debate thus concerned the principles of political 
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exclusion: who should be deprived of political rights and how. The discontinuity 
with the previous social and political regime was conceived by the future-oriented 
concept of “revolution”, the key concept of making the people the political subject. 
All legitimate political forces applied the concept of revolution (though, as will be 
shown later, with diﬀ erent meanings): the idea of necessary social change was an 
inherent aspect of the post-war democratic utopia.
The asymmetric counter-concepts of revolution and reaction (fascism) served as 
the two poles of the discursive fi eld, structuring the positions taken by the actors. Let 
us fi rst see how the political forces, the party of the populists in particular, positioned 
themselves in relation to the question of revolution.
1.1 Th e inclusion of the people: Liberation in non-revolutionary times
What was called the liberation of the people was a common program of the coalition 
parties, each representing a distinct social category: two represented the peasantry, 
when two others parties represented the workers. It was consensual in the political 
space that some degree of social change was inevitable for the successful establishment 
of democracy. Put another way, the politics of the coalition period considered the 
simple implementation of democratic institutions, the liberation of the people from 
above, as insuﬃ  cient for democratization. As Péter Veres put it in his lecture at the 
University of Budapest, “from servants, the poor, the ragged ones there will never be 
human community, even if everybody will have voting rights and however strictly 
regulated equality before the law will be. […] In civic democracy, only the wealthy 
man is the really free man” (Veres 1945b).
What diﬀ erentiated the political standpoints was, on the one hand, the conception 
of revolution. While on the right of the political fi eld the term meant the radical and 
temporary change in history, on the left it referred to the reallocation of resources. 
The two extreme positions in this matter were taken by the smallholders and the 
communists. While the Smallholders’ Party as a whole was deeply engaged in social 
change to facilitate the democratic rule of the peasantry, its right wing argued for 
catching up with the West by introducing a liberal civic democracy, leaving intact the 
existing social relations. At the other extreme, the communists were completely silent 
about a proletarian revolution in Hungary, even though they stressed the need for social 
change by way of struggling against the fascist and reactionary forces. Therefore, 
the public position of the communists converged with the social democrats’ stand, 
which urged the necessary establishment of democracy in the transition to socialism. 
On the other hand, it was debated whether or not revolution was taking place in 
Hungary in the given historical situation and to what extent. What was problematized 
was that the social transformation began as a result of the war and an occupying 
foreign army and not as a consequence of popular action. A characteristic formulation 
in the period was that what had happened was an “unfi nished revolution”. Diﬀ erent 
strategies were suggested for solving the contradiction stemming from the lack of 
a full-scale revolution and its necessity. One addressed the need for economic (or 
social) democracy, that is, organized institutionalization that would attain what the 
missing revolution would have achieved: the reallocation of resources. It was not 
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enough to assure political equality by giving rights to the people; the economic life 
too had to be democratized.
For the populists, revolution was a historically necessary precondition of 
democracy. In his lecture entitled “Popular Democracy”,10  given at the Péter Pázmány 
University in 1945, Ferenc Erdei, vice president of the NPP, diﬀ erentiated between 
types of democracies in a historical materialist manner: while liberal democracy used 
to be a particular “social system” of the capitalist 19th century, in the present, popular 
democracy was historically appropriate. Therefore, it was anachronistic and useless 
to compare the Hungarian situation to the model of classical liberal democracy. He 
emphasized that liberal relations – that is, equal chances in politics, economics and 
justice – would result in the continual subordination of the peasantry and the working 
class, who were still in a disadvantageous situation. The ultimate goal was, however, 
the liberation of the people, identifi ed with these two social strata. Erdei defi ned 
popular democracy as the political method of the liberation of the people which is 
characterized by the continual struggle against the still existing power relations of the 
former feudal-fascist regime. In this fi ght, the breach of laws and rights was not only 
allowed but inevitable. Erdei fi nished his lecture with the depiction of the next phase 
of democratic transformation, consolidation. In his view, not only was the concept 
of the people identical with the two social categories that were previously the most 
subordinated, but revolution and democracy were also synonyms (Erdei 1945).
The populist standpoint was that even though social transformation was remarkable 
in contemporary Hungary, revolution, the necessary precondition of democracy, 
was lacking. In his seminal essay in Válasz, the periodical of the populists (edited 
by the acclaimed popular author Gyula Illyés), Imre Kovács, vice-president of the 
NPP, argued in November 1946 that in every country, democracy was the outcome 
of struggle: either by votes or on barricades. Kovács wrote about the desired and 
necessary social transformation as “our liberation [that] takes place as a change of 
nation [nemzetváltás]”. During this process, “the gentry [úri] nation steps down from 
the scene and into its place are coming the peasants and workers, beside whom, as 
always, we call on the progressive intellectuals. We are part of the most touching and 
most exciting process: the people becoming a nation!” Getting peasants and workers 
onto the political stage, the “other nation” that had previously been subordinated 
for centuries, meant for Kovács a profound transformation not only in terms of 
institutions but also mentality: “The people: passivity. The nation: readiness. While 
the fi rst is instinctive, the second conscious; the fi rst is governed, the second governs 
itself”. In this regard, Kovács held, the peasants and the workers will compose the best 
fusion since they will counterbalance each other’s extremities. The problem, observed 
Kovács, was that Hungary lacked such revolution. “In Hungary, it was neither by 
progress, nor by revolution, but through war operations that democracy was born. 
Progress was not possible, and revolution was hindered by international agreement: 
10 Before the communist campaign on “popular democracy” one year later, the term was diversely used in various 
political positions, meaning the rule of the popular classes. Since the 1930s, in the populists’ vocabulary the 
concept had referred to a sort of “peasant democracy”. For the traditional left, popular democracy meant 
rather “workers’ democracy” (the concept was popular and popularized internationally by the Republican 
Zone during the Spanish Civil War, see Seidman 2018). In 1945, even the smallholders used the term.
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whether we wanted to or not, we had to become democrats”. Consequently, democracy 
as a political system was not chosen: “we have become democrats without being 
democrats” (Ková cs 1992, pp.174-189).
István Bibó, a good friend of Erdei, who joined the NPP in May 1945, published 
his essay about the crisis of democracy in October in the new periodical Valóság, 
edited by Zoltán Szabó, an important member of the populist movement. Unlike 
other populists, Bibó had had the possibility to study at western European universities 
and this western-based education had its impact on his thinking, which had a strong 
international, even universalist perspective. For Bibó, revolution was a necessary 
precondition of democracy: from a social-psychological perspective, he characterized 
democracy as “a spiritual liberation from the psychological pressure of divine, 
hereditary, or supernatural political powers” (Bibó 1991[1945]: 121). As a universal 
historical necessity, this liberation is only possible through revolution, by which 
the people become aware of the fact that the authority of the leaders is based on 
their consent. “This kind of revolution is not limited to certain periods of social or 
economic development; social and economic transformation may take place without 
noticeable political upheavals, but the revolution of human dignity must take place at 
some moment – regardless of the stage of social or economic development – in order 
for democracy to emerge” (Bibó 1991 [1945]: 121). Bibó argued that one aspect of 
the crisis of democracy in contemporary Hungary manifested in the confusion about 
the interpretation of democracy and the necessity of revolution. Like Kovács, he 
observed in the country only a semi-revolution: “Can we talk about revolution, when 
the people […] experienced not their own strength in bringing about the changes, 
but that of outside forces which they consider elemental in nature? Hardly!” (Bibó 
1991[1945]: 124). Bibó proposed a peculiar solution to the problem arising from the 
tension between the necessity of revolution and the “completely non-revolutionary 
nature of the times”. He held that the hysterical atmosphere of the public, too much 
change seen by the right while too little by the left, should be calmed down by the 
careful but clear-cut separation of the social domains of change and consolidation. 
He called this method, situated between universal revolution and political agreement, 
“limited and planned revolution”. 
The populist position on the problem of the inclusion of the people into the 
political community was similar to that of the other political forces and the system as a 
whole. They agreed that it was only through revolutionary change that the people, the 
peasantry and the working class could be uplifted and made into a political subject. 
Under the given historical circumstances, they didn’t see enough revolution, and 
urged the completion of the revolutionary progress triggered by the war (the most 
important element of which was for them the land reform).
1.2  Th e exclusion of antidemocratic elements: Th e struggle against fascism and 
reaction
Since antidemocratic ideas were identifi ed as the “remnants of the past”, the 
(temporary) restriction of the political community was legitimized by the necessary 
avoidance of the return of/to the past. In general, post-war political parties in Hungary 
did not consider fascism as a real danger for the present. However, the communists 
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continually and forcefully applied this label, and as a discursive form of “never again”, 
it was subject to public debate. As Béla Zsolt, a writer and politician of the liberal civic 
radical movement, provocatively put it (Zsolt 1945a), paraphrasing László Németh’s 
idea of the “third side”11: “Is it then a democracy, if the Papuans are given the secret 
ballot and the right to electioneering, and due to the election and the electioneering, 
the national sovereignty decides, with the great majority of votes, that cannibalism 
is a democratically confi rmed program?”. Declaring that “white cannibalism” could 
freely rage for 12 years in the middle of Europe, Zsolt considered the avoidance of 
cannibalism ever again more important than having a formal democracy. Negative 
references to the Weimar Republic, here as a “formal democracy” giving birth to 
fascism, were common in every coalition party.
Among the populists, the problem of fascism was not central in the struggle against 
the “remnants of the past”. Concerning the demarcation of the demos, they considered 
the fi ght against reaction acute. For them, as for the other political forces, the exclusion 
of social elements from voting rights and the political community because of their 
reactionary nature was legitimate. What they criticized was the method of the struggle 
against reaction. In a 1946 article in Szabad Szó, Imre Kovács criticized the confusion 
around the notion of reaction. 
He diﬀ erentiated between those reactionaries who react to certain actions in politics 
from those who “want to restore the old world”:
“Something is wrong with the fi ght against reaction. [...] There are actions that trigger 
reaction and one cannot put under the same umbrella every utterance that does not match 
with the ideas and programs of one or another party. The most serious cause of the current 
crisis in Hungarian democracy is the overgeneralization of the accusation of reaction, 
the unfortunate critical position which blames on the reaction even the impotency, the 
stagnation, and the pullulating Panamas and corruption” (Kovács 1992 [1946b]: 147).
As a solution, Kovács proposed concretizing the reaction, to accurately defi ne who is 
reactionary, and to join forces for the peasantry and the workers in the struggle against 
reaction.
István Bibó also proposed clarifying the fi ght against the “burdens of the past”. 
His central argument was that the struggles against fascism and reaction must 
be separated. Fascism was not the primary problem for Bibó, he thought that “for 
a long time it would not appear in organizational or ideological units” (Bibó 1986 
[1946b]: 302). For him, the presence of fascism appeared as the question of criminal 
responsibility. He defi ned fascism as “an active, aggressive attitude, which in its fi nal, 
fully developed, twisted form manifests itself as a concerted criminal attack on both the 
past and the future of Europe” (Bibó 1991[1945]: 101). Consequently, he considered 
the war crimes trials (Zinner 1985, Nánási 2011) and the verifi cation committees 
(Zinner 1985) as legitimate and appropriate institutional instruments of the struggle 
11 One of the most influential intellectuals of the populist movement, author László Németh explained the 
concept of the “third way” at the 1943 Balatonszárszó meeting as follows: “Let’s say that in New Guinea 
there’s a party that supports New Guinea belonging to the English. Another believes that New Guinea can 
prosper only under the Dutch. And now someone stands up and asks: Can’t New Guinea belong to the 
Papuans? That’s the third way” (in Esbenshade 2014: 178). In earlier popular-urbanist debates Németh and 
Zsolt emblematically represented the opposite sides, respectively. On the debates see Esbenshade 2014.
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against fascism. The problem with this democratic fi ght for Bibó lay in its failure 
to provide clear criteria of moral judgement, based on which anyone could assess 
others and their own past acts: “As for the People’s Courts, they should be dealing 
with actual, accountable crimes, not the typical and conventional manifestations of 
politically narrow minds that ruled this country for 25 years” (Bibó 1991[1945]: 110). 
Put another way, judgements of war crimes trials should institutionally inscribe what 
past acts qualifi ed as fascism. Bibó found the “close relationship” between fascism 
and reaction problematic:
“Fascism is the amalgam of distorted traditionalism and distorted revolution, of reaction 
and a distorted left” (Bibó 1986 [1946a]: 108). Its alliance with reaction comes from the 
fact that “fascists – among other things – attack things of which reactionaries are afraid” 
(Bibó 1991[1945]: 102).
This is why “sizable segments of the middle class, the intelligentsia, the petit 
bourgeoisie, and even the proletariat responded to certain slogans of fascism, without 
becoming genuine fascists themselves” (Bibó 1991[1945]: 107). The crisis of the 
struggle against fascism, which Bibó attributed to the communist tactics confusing 
the concepts of fascism and reaction, means that these masses were criminalized by 
the people’s jurisdiction, leading to their (temporary) exclusion from democracy. 
They were thus lost for the nation, Bibó held, because of the lack of the public 
sentiment necessary to admit a forgivable mistake, clearly diﬀ erentiated from criminal 
responsibility, for involving these people in democracy.
Bibó saw the problem of reaction as more complicated, being less visible than 
fascism, and, being rather a condition than an intention, less accountable, not graspable 
by criminal means. Like Imre Kovács, he held that “the major drawback of this method 
of fi ghting reactionaries is that it is unable to make a distinction between the limited 
circle of genuine reactionaries and those elements of consolidation who are turned 
into reactionaries by their fear of the struggle itself” (Bibó 1991[1945]: 103). These 
elements which, according to Bibó, provided much of the Smallholders Party's voting 
power, are characterized by the need for consolidation due to the loss of security 
they enjoyed in the former gentry society. These masses must not be overcome, Bibó 
said, but included into the demos by associating to democracy not only the idea of 
radical transformation, but also of stability and order. He believed that giving a clear 
defi nition of the social domains of consolidation and stability, and separating them 
from the democratic-revolutionary transformation, would contribute to the inclusion 
of the “consolidation elements” into democracy. Reaction “in the strictest sense of 
the word”, by contrast, means “fatal petrifi cation, the return of the unhealthy power 
relationships of the old days” (Bibó 1991[1945]: 126), against which Bibó considered 
the fi ght necessary by a conscious revolutionary reform policy, that is, by fi nishing the 
semi-revolution.
While in the autumn of 1945 the key issue of democratization for Bibó was the 
inclusion of “consolidation elements”, a year later, before the announced municipal 
government elections, he focused on the exclusion of reactionaries. He included under 
reaction all the social groups that saw in the loss of the old gentry middle class of 
Hungary the death of a beautiful, orderly and good world, and the beginning of a 
hopeless and anarchic state in democratic transformation. The current problem for Bibó 
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was that in 1945 the Smallholders’ Party gained 57% of the votes with the support of 
the reactionary voters (on the basis of a survey, Bibó estimated the reactionary share 
at 30%). Thus, he considered the Smallholders’ Party’s absolute majority fi ctitious. 
That is, though the party held the absolute majority of the votes, it did not really 
represent the absolute majority of the demos. Bibó concluded that simply letting 
the smallholders win the municipal elections would be disastrous, a “catastrophe 
politics”. The new catastrophe would be that “the whole election would be counter-
revolutionary, and the whole process would take the form of a gentlemanly restoration” 
(Bibó 1986 [1946b]: 319). Bibó had several propositions to prevent the reoccurrence 
of the historical catastrophe. With the communist idea to restrict voting rights, he only 
had technical problems (that it is hard to identify who is reactionary). For Bibó, the 
solution would have been to exclude the political representation of reactionaries from 
the Smallholders’ Party. One of Bibó’s propositions was to allow the parties to the 
right of the smallholders to take part in the election, to take the “hostile votes against 
democracy” away from the Smallholders Party. With the possibility of institutional 
political representation, the right wing would have of course been strengthened; Bibó 
would have compensated for this by giving legitimate guaranties of the priority to the 
coalition parties, although temporarily. The new right-wing parties would thus have 
started from a legitimate competitive disadvantage in the elections. He also suggested 
that the “real” voting rates realized at the municipal elections should be enforced on 
the national level; that is, that the smallholders would lose parliamentary mandates 
according to their results at the municipal elections. This would have ended the 
fi ctitious majority of the party on the national level. The core of Bibó’s strategy was, 
however, a comprehensive reform that would have created a democratic framework in 
public administration in which the people could experience and practice the freedom 
and responsibility of self-determination. The reform proposal of the peasant party, 
written by Bibó and Erdei, published in the summer of 1946 in Szabad Szó (A magyar 
közigazgatás reformja 1946), was never realized.
In sum, populists, like other democratic critics of the fi ght against reaction, did not 
question the legitimacy of political exclusion, and called for improving its eﬃ  ciency. 
What explains this is the fact that in the transitional historical situation, the political 
elite, in order to establish a democratic political system, aimed to (temporarily) restrict 
politics to the democrats. It is in this context that the communist party’s campaign 
for popular democracy, launched that summer, should be interpreted. The concept 
of popular democracy had been used before, mainly by the smallholders but also 
by the populists (Erdei 1945). It meant “real” democracy – that is, the rule of the 
people, in opposition to the former parliamentary system, in which the peasantry and 
the working class had been excluded and suppressed. This meaning of the term was 
radically transformed by the campaign of the Hungarian Communist Party, which 
targeted the reactionary elements sneaking back to politics by way of the Smallholders’ 
Party (Rákosi 1946; Révai 1946a, 1946b). Popular democracy now meant the fi ght 
against “right-wing reaction” and the peaceful – that is, non-violent and gradual – 
transition to socialism. The campaign of the communists triggered the debate between 
the proponents of civic and popular democracy, thus between the FKgP (e.g. Hám 
1946) and the MKP, respectively.
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2. Positions in the ethnoscape: Th e Jewish and the German question
One can contend that the political position of the populists in the democracy debate 
did not considerably diﬀ er from the other political forces’ standpoints. In other words, 
basic claims of the populists were embraced by public political consensus. This does 
not mean, however, that the strategies of the political forces in taking this position 
were identical. What marks the populists in post-war politics is the way they connected 
the issues of modernization, social justice, and ethnic identity. This was a continuing 
feature before, during and after the war. I will now briefl y discuss the continuity of 
the popular tradition after the “historical catastrophe” in relation to the redefi nition 
of the ethnoscape. Historically, the two outstanding changes in this regard were 
undoubtedly the destruction of the Jews of the Hungarian countryside in 1944, and 
the forced relocation of half of the population with German origin between 1946 and 
1948. Both the abolishment of the anti-Jewish laws and decrees of the previous regime 
and the legal withdrawal of the civic rights of ethnic Germans arose as problems of 
democratization in post-war Hungary.
The two ethnic categories of Jews and Germans (or, pejoratively, Swabians) 
were at the heart of the populists’ self-identity from the beginning. In their eyes, they 
represented the two social categories of the foreign elite (of capitalist modernization), 
in opposition to the exploited Hungarian peasantry. Despite the historical changes 
of 1945, the basic attitude of the populist movement remained critical towards both 
groups precisely because they had always construed the acute questions of Hungarian 
society in relation to the social injustice of capitalism in ethnic terms. They did not, 
or could not, come to terms with key elements of the populist tradition of the interwar 
period: the critique of assimilation and the ethnic framing of social injustice.
As a salient feature of early post-war politics in Hungary, the decades-long debate 
on the so-called Jewish question continued in the public even after the tragic year of 
1944 (Karády 2016). One aspect of the controversy addressed precisely the legitimacy 
of the Jewish question in democracy. The answer of the populists was positive. As a 
matter of fact, it was an acknowledged populist author, József Darvas, vice president 
of NPP, whose piece in the communist daily newspaper reanimated the polemics as 
early as March 1945 (Darvas 1945a). In an article entitled “For an Honest Voice on 
the Jewish Question”, Darvas made the case for the continued existence of the Jewish 
question which he sharply distinguished from antisemitism. He argued that the honest 
discussion of the former will prevent the growth of the latter, a notable enemy of 
democracy. By honest discussion, Darvas meant the critique of “both sides”: a minor 
part of the Jews overemphasizing Jewish suﬀ ering as a sort of a new privilege, and 
a minor part of the Hungarian people, infected by the previous fascist propaganda, 
who did not dare anymore to pronounce the word “Jew” but whose minds were still 
haunted by the myths of “Jewish revenge” and “Jewish power”. In his view, “both 
sides” applied racial diﬀ erentiation, which he equally refused as unacceptable. 
Darvas’s “honest words”, repeated in several public forums, such as the press of the 
Jewish communities (Őszinte beszélgetés 1945) or the NPP’s fi rst assembly in August 
(Darvas 1945b), triggered a public debate in which Darvas and the Peasant Party 
was blamed for (new) antisemitism. The critiques condemned that Darvas applied 
the same racial classifi cation as the anti-Jewish laws or the Arrow Cross rule in the 
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past (Hámori 1945; Parragi 1945; Zsolt 1945b). The SzDP even adopted a resolution 
that oﬃ  cially condemned the voice of Darvas and Kovács at the NPP’s assembly, 
which was, from the socialist point of view, the same voice ruling in 1944 (Elítélő 
határozat, 1945). In his comrade’s and party’s defense, Imre Kovács repeated the 
same argument. He stated that only the “foreign elements of Hungarian society” had 
been anti-Semitic, the Hungarian people had gotten on well with the Jews. However, 
he continued, now the Jews collectively blamed the Hungarians as a whole for what 
had happened to them, and this was the cause of new antisemitism. Kovács went 
even further when he said: “The Jewry has occupied such positions in the police, the 
public administration and the economy, from which it makes its dislike felt toward the 
Hungarians” (Kovács 1945c). The editorial of the FKgP’s daily newspaper pointed to 
the fact that because of the deportations, the number of Jews signifi cantly decreased, 
which makes it hard to speak about Jewish occupation (Változott helyzet 1945). The 
Hungarian Communist Party, remaining completely silent about the fact that Darvas 
actually triggered the controversy in its daily, condemned Darvas for adding fuel to 
the still glimmering fi re of antisemitism in the Hungarian people by publicly raising 
the Jewish question (Tintahal taktika 1945). In general, the leftist standpoint identifi ed 
the Jewish question with antisemitism, considering it an anachronistic and dangerous 
maneuver in order to obscure the acute problems of society (Betlen 1945, Schiﬀ er 
1946). 
In 1946, the debate on the Jewish question continued with the same pattern between 
Péter Veres and Béla Zsolt, in line with the land reform, about the right of former Jewish 
owners, whose property had been confi scated, to get the land back (Veres served as 
president of the council responsible for the realization of the land reform). Zsolt spoke 
of Veres as a fascist threat to democracy who denies the restitution of the land to former 
Jewish owners and attributes an unwritten anti-Jewish law to him according to which in 
Hungary Jews could not own land. Veres referred to the rules of the land reform which 
did not treat the case of former Jewish owners as a problem of restitution and therefore 
identifi ed Zsolt’s position as Jewish. The last major contribution of the populists to the 
post-war discussion of the Jewish question before the communist takeover was István 
Bibó’s essay “The Jewish question in Hungary after 1944” published in 1948 in Válasz 
(Bibó 1991[1948]). For its honest and near-heroic attempt to confront the question 
of responsibility for what is called today the Holocaust, Bibó’s highly acclaimed 
argument in many respects seems to contradict the populists’ discursive strategy of 
the earlier debates. Bibó saw two typical positions in earlier post-war discussions 
of the Jewish question, both unsatisfactory: the declaration that the majority of the 
Hungarian people remained unaﬀ ected by antisemitism, and that the fi ght against new 
antisemitism was a fundamental task of democracy. Bibó argued that the chance for 
taking responsibility collectively, in the name of the nation was not anymore possible 
four years after the catastrophe, so the only solution remained to confront the past 
individually, by an honest search of the soul. Bibó’s essay served as a great example 
for that. At the same time, Bibó shared the key presuppositions that had previously 
marked the populists’ discourse: the legitimacy of the Jewish question in post-war 
Hungary, its distinction from “new antisemitism”, the belief that the discussion of the 
former prevents the latter, and the treatment of the problem as a socially ill relation of 
two sides, Hungarians and Jews, conceived as distinctive historical entities with their 
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distinct historical experiences.12  Bibó remained essentially critical of assimilation, 
because of the assumed particularities of both the Hungarian and the Jewish society 
(Gyáni 2011).
The so-called Swabian question did not have such a “prestigious” tradition 
in post-war Hungary as compared to the Jewish question. The retribution against 
the Hungarian German population was highly legitimate and supported not only 
nationally but also on the international scene. Furthermore, Hungary strove to 
appear as moderate in the given circumstances, since it did not want to compromise 
the situation of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, exposed to the “exchange of 
population” with the Slovaks in Hungary. Minor confl icts occurred, mainly over the 
legitimacy of the application of the collective guilt principle, and over the criteria 
of defi nition by which the scope of the population aﬀ ected would be established. In 
general, it was the collective guilt principle that was institutionalized between 1944 
and 1949 (Zombory 2016). In January 1946, when the expulsions began, only 26 
intellectuals expressed their opposition in a public declaration in the daily Magyar 
Nemzet, on 18 January 1946. Even Béla Zsolt, who considered forced repopulation as 
a genuine fascist heritage, thus irreconcilable with democracy, argued that those who 
fell under the scope of the relocation decree were undoubtedly guilty of fascism and 
merited punishment. He opposed the application of the collective guilt principle, and 
warned against making the Swabians a scapegoat, and thus shifting the responsibility 
from the shoulders of Hungarian perpetrators (Zsolt 1946).
The populists were coherently anti-German from the beginning, so it is not 
surprising that they wholeheartedly supported the idea of German relocation after the 
war (Erdei as minister of the interior of the provisional government took an active part 
in the expulsions’ realization).13  For the populists, beyond an instrument of retribution, 
forced relocation of the Germans from Hungary remained a social question connected 
to the distribution of the land. Maybe this explains why the populists’ voice in the 
national anti-German choir, together with that of the communists, was the loudest 
after the war. Imre Kovács, who numerous times attacked the hold of the centuries-old 
“German domination” on the Hungarian people, in his article in the populists’ daily 
newspaper attributed the war destruction to the Germans and their Hungarian ally, the 
Swabians. “There is no hope that the two peoples could get along peacefully with each 
other. One of them must go, and there is no question which one that is … Swabians 
don’t merit mercy… Let them get out of here! – as they came: with one pack on their 
back” (Kovács 1945a). Kovács repeatedly explained in public that one of the crucial 
tests of democracy is to reckon with the hold of the German impact on the Hungarian 
people (Kovács 1945b, 1946b).
In sum, the position of the populist movement in relation to the ethnoscape in post-
war Hungary was marked by the continuity of the way it problematized Hungarian 
12 In his comments on Gyula Borbándi’s The Hungarian Populism, Bibó theoretically distinguished antisemitism 
from the “sense of ethnic distinctiveness in relation to Jews”, the treatment of Jews as a distinct ethnic group 
that can be associated with both malignity and benevolence (Bibó 1978[1986]). However, it is hard to think 
of postulating a social problem as “Jewish”, or vice versa, the “Jewish” as a social problem, as an example of 
neutral ethnic differentiation.
13 On the internal and international resettlement of Hungarian Germans, see Tóth 1993.
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society. They adopted a basically ethnic formulation of social inequalities inherited 
from infl uential interwar authors such as Dezső Szabó and László Németh: they 
believed that the central subject of modernization should be the essential national 
category, the peasantry, which had gotten stuck because the role of modernization 
was assumed by the foreign categories of Jews and Germans. As a consequence, 
the populists remained anti-assimilationists after the war while distinguishing the 
supposedly value-free ethnic diﬀ erentiation from (new) antisemitism.
Conclusion
This article proposed to reconsider the relation between populism and democracy by 
opening the debate on democracy’s relation to populism. Instead of assessing populist 
politics in whatever historical context according to the currently prevailing normative 
democracy-idea, it argued for problematizing the idea of democracy not as a given but 
as historical process of continual redefi nition. The primary aim was to call attention 
for a necessary historicization of the democracy-idea itself when treating the problem 
of contemporary populism. A historical case study was presented here as an example 
when the refl exivity with regards to democracy’s boundaries and on democracy’s 
nature as a whole composed a political context in which the particular populist claims 
lost signifi cance since they were posed in the context of the political system. The 
public debate on democracy in early post-war Hungary has been conceptualized above 
as the process of (eventually failed) democratic self-constitution in which the political 
problem par excellence was the demarcation of the political community. In the public 
debate on democracy, participants addressed the question of the legitimacy of drawing 
the boundaries of the demos. Because of the specifi cities of the historical context and 
the “post-catastrophic” temporality experienced by the actors, questions of refl exive 
democratization stemmed from the ideas of the liberation of the people through 
revolutionary social transformation and the political exclusion of antidemocratic 
elements of society, perceived as representing the former regime. The discursive fi eld 
of politics was structured by two features. One of them was the awareness of the 
political, social, and moral failure of the former regime. Contemporaries perceived the 
topical questions of their present as resulting from the historical catastrophe. Therefore, 
their politics were driven by the need to avoid the repetition of the catastrophic past. 
On the other hand, the defi nition of the polity’s boundaries meant the inclusion of 
those social categories, which were before deprived of political agency. 
Even though the few early post-war transitional years happened to be a great 
historical moment for the Hungarian populist movement, its members could not 
benefi t from it as they were part of the political elite. In general, the position of the 
populists was not distinctive in the limited sphere of politics. It diﬀ ered in how they 
assessed the two reference points of politics: the revolution and the struggle against 
fascism and reaction. Another distinctive feature of the populists was their ethnic view 
of social injustice, and their essentially critical attitude towards assimilation of the 
Jews and the Germans, conceived in the populist tradition as the foreign agents of 
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Democracy and Populism. Th e Constitution of the Political Community 
in Early Post-War Hungary
Th is article proposes to reconsider the relation between populism and democracy. Instead 
of taking democracy as a given, it will study populism in the context of democratization 
in a case study from a historical sociological perspective. Th e post-war and pre-Cold 
War historical context is analyzed here on the example of Hungary. First, I analyze 
the public debate on democracy in order to map out the discursive fi eld in which the 
diff erent political positions were taken. I show that the debate was about the legitimate 
defi nition of the political community, the demos. Second, I situate the political wing of 
the Hungarian populist movement in this discursive fi eld. I establish that the position 
of the populists’ party did not diff er considerably from the standpoint of the other 
participants: the basic populist claims and references were articulated as part of the 
problem of democracy. Th ird, I analyze the continuity of the populist tradition in the 
context of the post-war redefi nition of the ethnoscape, that is, in relation to the “Jewish 
question” and the “German question”.
Keywords: democracy, populism, early post-war period, Hungary, historical sociology.
Démocratie et populisme. La constitution de la communauté politique 
dans la Hongrie de l’après-guerre
Cet article propose d’étudier la relation entre populisme et démocratie. Au lieu de 
considérer la démocratie comme un acquis, il examinera le populisme dans le contexte 
de la démocratisation, à travers une étude de cas de la Hongrie de l’après-guerre et 
de l’avant-guerre froide et dans une perspective de sociologie historique. D’abord, il 
propose une analyse du débat public sur la démocratie afi n de défi nir le champ discursif 
dans lequel les diff érentes acteurs politiques ont exprimé leurs positions. Il montre que le 
débat dans l’espace public portait sur la défi nition de la communauté politique, les démos. 
Ensuite, l’article examine plus spécifi quement le mouvement populiste hongrois et son 
positionnement dans ce champ discursif. Il établit que la position du parti populiste 
hongrois n’était pas très diff érente de celle des autres partis politiques de l’époque : leurs 
revendications et références fondamentales ont été articulées dans le cadre du problème 
de la démocratie. Enfi n, l’article analyse la continuité de la tradition populiste dans le 
contexte de la redéfi nition du caractère de la communauté nationale, c’est-à-dire par 
rapport à la « question juive » et la « question allemande ».
Mots-clés  : démocratie, populisme, Europe centrale et orientale, entre-deux-guerres, 
partis paysans.
